How fear of future outcomes affects social dynamics by Podobnik, Boris et al.
How fear of future outcomes affects social dynamics
Boris Podobnik1,2,3,*, Marko Jusup4, Zhen Wang5, H. Eugene Stanley1,
1 Center for Polymer Studies and Department of Physics, Boston
University, Boston, MA 02215
2 Faculty of Civil Engineering, University of Rijeka, 51000 Rijeka, Croatia
3 Zagreb School of Economics and Management, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia
4 Center of Mathematics for Social Creativity, Hokkaido University,
Sapporo 060-0812, Japan
5 Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu
University, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
* bp@phy.hr
Abstract
Mutualistic relationships among the different species are ubiquitous in nature. To
prevent mutualism from slipping into antagonism, a host often invokes a “carrot and
stick” approach towards symbionts with a stabilizing effect on their symbiosis. In open
human societies, a mutualistic relationship arises when a native insider population
attracts outsiders with benevolent incentives in hope that the additional labor will
improve the standard of all. A lingering question, however, is the extent to which
insiders are willing to tolerate outsiders before mutualism slips into antagonism. To test
the assertion by Karl Popper that unlimited tolerance leads to the demise of tolerance,
we model a society under a growing incursion from the outside. Guided by their
traditions of maintaining the social fabric and prizing tolerance, the insiders reduce
their benevolence toward the growing subpopulation of outsiders but do not invoke
punishment. This reduction of benevolence intensifies as less tolerant insiders (e.g.,
“radicals”) openly renounce benevolence. Although more tolerant insiders maintain some
level of benevolence, they may also tacitly support radicals out of fear for the future. If
radicals and their tacit supporters achieve a critical majority, herd behavior ensues and
the relation between the insider and outsider subpopulations turns antagonistic. To
control the risk of unwanted social dynamics, we map the parameter space within which
the tolerance of insiders is in balance with the assimilation of outsiders, the tolerant
insiders maintain a sustainable majority, and any reduction in benevolence occurs
smoothly. We also identify the circumstances that cause the relations between insiders
and outsiders to collapse or that lead to the dominance of the outsiders.
Keywords: game theory — complex networks — social thermodynamics — open
systems — tolerance — herd behavior
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Introduction
Karl Popper famously stated that unlimited tolerance leads to the demise of
tolerance [1]. The tag-based [2] quantitative model of Riolo, Cohen, and Axelrod [3]
indicates that a combination of kin selection and mutation causes times of high
tolerance to be replaced by times of low tolerance towards those who are different.
These tides of (in)tolerance [4] seemingly dismiss the role of human reasoning in the
selection process as unable to stave off periods during which undesirable states of affairs
prevail. In contrast, the basic negative result of evolutionary game theory that
unconditional cooperators are vulnerable to rare occurrences of unconditional
defectors [5] can be avoided by appending an indirect reciprocity mechanism to the
selection process, i.e., a concern for such abstract realities as reputation, and the ability
to use some form of language to spread information. It would thus seem that humans
are able to draw on such collective mechanisms as democracy [6] to adjust the course of
selection in a preferable direction—and sometimes they are not [7].
Humans are conditional cooperators [2, 8, 9], yet on occasion may benevolently help
even those who can never repay in kind. Although this cooperativeness is seen as the
result of evolutionary selection [2, 3, 6, 8–13], it is less clear why benevolence would
permeate human societies. Popper’s statement, however, helps us identify how certain
mechanisms may sustain benevolence. When a benevolent population is attracting an
inflow from the outside, such that a society undergoes the transient dynamics,
understanding the relationship between the inflow rate and human behavior is key. If
the rate of inflow is low the original population may feel safe, but if the inflow is high it
may be perceived as aggression and provoke—in a sort of Popperian twist—a violent
response. The very idea of these two limits suggests that benevolence is a relative
category and is dependent on the inflow from the outside and the resulting state [14].
Little is known about these dependencies of benevolence.
Model
To quantify the dynamics of an open society with a benevolent population, we create a
theoretical framework by combining the elements of biology (e.g., evolutionary games)
and statistical physics (e.g., complex networks). It was argued almost a decade ago that
the methods of statistical physics could contribute to social science [15]. This notion of
the usefulness of statistical physics in researching social phenomena appears to have
been appreciated in quantitative sociology, particularly the works on economic
complexity [16,17]. In line with these works, we represent human relationships in an
idealized manner by placing agents into a random network of friendships wherein each
possible link occurs independently with precisely such a probability that the average
degree is 50—a number consistent with Refs. [18, 19]. Agents in the model are thus
conditional cooperators in the sense that their interactions are restricted only to the
nearest neighbors defined by the network. At each time t, a total of m donor-recipient
pairs are randomly chosen [11] among neighboring agents, whereupon a donor pays cost
c for the recipient to receive benefit b. To this trivial scenario we add an asymmetry in
which insiders incur a higher cost of cooperation and provide more benefit to outsiders
than they receive in return. In this way, benefit differential ∆b emerges between insider
and outsider subpopulations, creating an incentive for outsiders to immigrate. The
overall purpose is to form a mutualistic relationship in which everyone experiences a
higher standard due to the extra labor provided by outsiders. When the selected m
donor-recipient pairs finish interacting, we calculate the fitness of both insiders and
outsiders—denoted Φ1 and Φ2, respectively—as the average per-capita benefit net of the
cost of cooperation. The details on the mathematical representation of the described
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setup are found in Supporting Information (SI text). Here, we just note that the
quantities of interest are the cost-benefit ratio, c/b, and the relative benefit differential,
∆b/b. A list of key symbols with some default parameter values is given in Table 1.
We envision a society that is an open dynamic system in the sense that its size
changes over time. To that end we adopt replicator-type equations. Specifically, if N1
and N2 denote the population sizes of insiders and outsiders, respectively, then the
time-change of these two subpopulations is given by Ni(t+ 1) = ΦiNi(t), i = 1, 2. The
fraction of outsiders in the system is defined as fg = N2/(N1 +N2), yielding
fg(t+ 1) =
Φ2(t)N2(t)
Φ1(t)N1(t) + Φ2(t)N2(t)
= R(t)fg(t), (1)
where R is the ratio of the fitness of outsiders to the average fitness of the whole
population, i.e., R = Φ2/ [Φ1(1− fg) + Φ2fg]. Here the time-change is both biological
and sociological, i.e., successful individuals can attract migrants of similar origin from
the outside.
We assume that outsiders can “mutate” into insiders (i.e., they can assimilate the
cultural patterns of the insiders) and vice versa (e.g., due to education or intermarriage).
Assimilation, often almost synonymously referred to as integration, has been receiving
considerable attention in the literature based on statistical physics [20–23]. Herein, we
represent the results of the assimilation process by a net rate p1. The net rate is either
positive or negative, where positive values indicate that the absolute assimilation rate is
higher for outsiders than insiders. Our analysis, however, revolves only around the case
p1 > 0 because, as long as the asymmetry in the system persists, and thus R > 1,
outsiders grow at a faster rate than insiders. In this sense, fitness ratio R is a global
measure of benevolence exhibited by insiders towards outsiders. For the two
subpopulations to equilibrate, the necessary and sufficient condition is p1 = R− 1,
which indicates that the more benevolent insiders are, the higher the net assimilation
rate needs to be for insiders to avoid being overrun by outsiders. If we allowed p1 < 0,
the two subpopulations could equilibrate only at some R < 1, which is impossible unless
insiders start to punish outsiders.
Fig 1. Benevolence is depen-
dent on the ubiquity of out-
siders. Benevolence, as reflected
by fitness ratio R, is a decreas-
ing function of the fraction of out-
siders, fg, although no explicit as-
sumptions were made to that ef-
fect. If the average tolerance of
insiders is low enough (red curve),
herd behavior causes a discontinu-
ity of function R = R(fg). Other-
wise (blue curve), the functional
dependence is continuous. Dashed
curves are analytical approxima-
tions (SI text). The assimilation
rate is p1 = 0.01.
How do insiders decide whether to
cooperate with outsiders? Relying on
the network of friendships as another
layer of social fabric, insiders face three
options: (i) remain benevolent, (ii)
behave benevolently, but question the
wisdom of doing so, or (iii) no longer
cooperate with outsiders. Insiders who
are surrounded by an overwhelming
number of outsiders can begin
to resent providing benefit without
receiving the same in return. Thus
when the local fraction of outsiders,
f i` , in the neighborhood of insider i
exceeds the tolerance threshold [24–26],
T ir , the insider defects by severing
all connections with outsiders. Insiders
who terminate all their friendships with
outsiders we label “radical agents.” As
a proxy for T ir we take a uniform random variable on the interval from T
min
r to
Tminr + σ, i.e., T
i
r ∼ U(Tminr , Tminr + σ). The higher the value of Tminr , the greater the
willingness of insiders to tolerate outsiders. Parameter σ is a measure of the degree of
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Table 1. Key symbols (parameters and state variables)
Symbol Definition Value
c/b cost-benefit ratio 10%
∆b/b relative benefit differential 25%
p1 assimilation rate –
Tminr minimum tolerance of insiders 0.05
σ tolerance range (individuality) –
Ic critical threshold for herd behavior 50%
fg fraction of outsiders in the total population
R fitness ratio measuring benevolence of insiders
〈Tr〉 average population tolerance
individuality, while its inverse 1/σ measures societal responsiveness—the lower its value,
the greater the extent to which insiders are willing to tolerate a large benefit differential.
When σ = 0, individuality among the insiders disappears and threshold distribution U
degenerates into a Dirac delta distribution. However, σ 6= 0 is more realistic because
tolerance is likely to vary among people. It is important that the complex network of
friendships, depending on the choice of tolerance parameters Tminr and σ relative to
assimilation parameter p1, may generate herd behavior [27] such that most connections
between insiders and outsiders get abruptly broken [26].
Envisioning herd behavior in a different yet related context [27], as the fraction of
outsiders (fg) increases, the fraction of radical agents increases, and the probability of
violent incidents occurring also increases. As violence increases in a society, tolerant
insiders (T ir  fg) may consider open animosity towards outsider friends overly radical,
yet adopt a conservative position [28] that, in effect, supports the radical faction—option
(ii) above. There emerges a disparity between how some insiders act and think [29]. If
Figure 2. Mean-field approximation of the implied social dynamics. A, The
fraction of radical insiders is a monotonically increasing function of the fraction of
outsiders until the latter reach a saturation level. Circles indicate the simulation results.
B, The probability of herd behavior during which cooperation between insiders and
outsiders collapses need not always increase with the fraction of outsiders because a
high level of outsiders may preclude radicals and their tacit supporters from reaching
the necessary majority. Here we study the case in which Ic is set to 50% of the total
population. The assimilation rate is p1 = 0.01.
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gt is the fraction of tacit supporters of radicals in a large population of N1 insiders, then
the probability of event Y = {N1gt ≥ Ic} is approximated by a cumulative Poisson
distribution, i.e., Pr(Y ) = exp(−λ)∑k≥Ic λk/k!, where λ is a size-dependent variable
that increases with the global fraction of outsiders fg. Specifically, we set
λ = N1(1− gr)fg, where gr is the fraction of insider radical agents. The term in
parentheses indicates that radicals cannot be tacit supporters at the same time. We
further assume that the increase in tacit supporters causes tension that, at some critical
Ic, becomes a violent reaction. Herd behavior ensues, resulting in the abrupt and
simultaneous severing of all connections between insiders and outsiders. An example of
a critical Ic in a democracy would be a value that gives a majority to radicals and their
supporters during an election. Fig. 1 shows the basic aspects of the implied social
dynamic, i.e., benevolence as a function of the fraction of outsiders in the system.
Mean-field theory provides a deeper understanding of the social dynamics implied by
the model. For example, we derive the probability that randomly picked insider i is
radical, i.e., the probability of event X = {f i` ≥ T ir}, where f i` is the local fraction of
outsider neighbors surrounding agent i and T ir is i’s tolerance. In the mean field
approximation, a substitute for f i` is its global counterpart, fg, which can further be
multiplied with the average degree of the network, 〈k〉, to estimate the number of
outsider neighbors of an insider. The insider can tolerate any number of outsiders
between kmin = dTminr 〈k〉e and kmax = d(Tminr + σ)〈k〉e with equal probability, where
d·e is the ceiling function. Consequently we obtain
Pr(X) =
1
kmax − kmin + 1
kmax∑
l=kmin
〈k〉∑
k=l
(〈k〉
k
)
fkg (1− fg)〈k〉−k. (2)
Fig. 2A compares the results of Eq. (2) with the corresponding numerical simulations.
Note that a population of insiders with a higher than average tolerance contains fewer
radicals for a given fraction of outsiders and allows outsiders to reach a higher saturation
level. The agreement between the analytical results and the simulations is favorable.
Using Eq. (2) we can characterize the dependence of the probability of herd behavior
on the fraction of outsiders. In accordance with our definitions, herd behavior occurs
when radicals and their tacit supporters reach a critical threshold Ic. Because the
number of radicals in the system is given by N1gr, we only need to consider the
probability of event Y = {N1gt ≥ Ic −N1gr}, which—as described above—is given by
the cumulative Poisson distribution. In general, the population of insiders, N1, is large
and parameter λ ∝ N1 of the Poisson distribution is also large, and this allows us to use
the normal approximation for probability Pr(Y ). Accordingly,
Pr(Y ) ≈ 1− Fnorm(Ic/N1 − gr;λ/N1,
√
λ/N1), where Fnorm is the cumulative
distribution function of a normal random variable with mean λ/N1 = (1− gr)fg and
standard deviation
√
λ/N1 =
√
(1− gr)fg/N1. During the calculations gr is replaced
with Pr(X) from Eq. (2). Fig. 2B shows the favorable comparison between this
approximation and the simulation results and indicates that herd behavior becomes
possible only when the fraction of outsiders is already high, i.e., fg ≈ 0.4. As fg
continues to increase, the possibility of herd behavior becomes increasingly remote
because it is now difficult for radicals and their tacit supporters to acquire an electoral
majority.
Although analytical results help us understand the dynamics of the model,
comprehensive mapping of the parameter space is often impossible without resorting to
numerical simulations. Before detailing the results of these simulations, we emphasize
how Fig. 1 shows that benevolence measured by fitness ratio R is a decreasing function
of the fraction of outsiders fg. A diminishing benevolence in the presence of a benefit
differential is hardly surprising given that benevolent populations disappear by virtue of
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evolutionary dynamics. The question, therefore, is whether and under what conditions
adjusting benevolence is sufficient to accommodate an incursion of outsiders without
causing societal turmoil. Accordingly, we recognize three different types of outcomes in
numerical simulations (Fig. 3):
Mutualism is a set of equilibrium states reached by a smooth reduction of
benevolence to a level at which insiders maintain a sustainable majority
(continuous blue curve in Fig. 1).
Outsider dominance is a set of equilibrium states wherein the outsiders form a
majority.
Antagonism is a set of non-equilibrium, absorbing states due to a complete
breakdown of cooperation between the two subpopulations (discontinuous red
curve in Fig. 1)
We find that over a considerable portion of the parameter space the tolerance of insiders
is in balance with the assimilation of outsiders, and there is a smooth reduction of
benevolence to a level at which insiders maintain a sustainable majority (see the
Mutualism region in Fig. 3).
Figure 3. Outcomes of the
social dynamics. A benevolent
society faces three possible out-
comes of the social dynamics when
dealing with an inflow of individu-
als from the outside: (i) benev-
olence is adjusted to a sustain-
able level for insiders to hold a
majority in a balanced interplay
between their tolerance and the as-
similation of outsiders, (ii) benevo-
lence is kept too high for too long
and insiders turn to a minority
owing to their excessive tolerance
relative to the assimilation of out-
siders, and (iii) the society is po-
larized due to a failure to adjust
the benevolence of insufficiently
tolerant insiders relative to the as-
similation of outsiders. We stud-
ied cases in which the tolerance
of insiders is unaffected (red) and
affected (blue) by assimilated out-
siders. Curves of best fit added as
a visual aid.
Outsiders dominate
when there is an imbalance between
their assimilation and the tolerance of
insiders, i.e., the insiders maintain their
benevolence at a very high level or
for a very long time (see the Outsider
dominance region in Fig. 3). If insider
tolerance is insufficient relative to the
assimilation of outsiders, the society
becomes polarized, and cooperation
between the two subpopulations
breaks down completely [30,31]
(see the Antagonism region in Fig. 3).
From the perspective of the native
insider population, the two latter
outcomes are unsatisfactory. On the
one hand, outsider dominance may lead
to the disappearance of the cultural
patterns of insiders. On the other hand,
antagonism leads to social turmoil, thus defeating the purpose of the initial incentive to
attract outsiders.
The simplified structure of the present model makes it possible to find a necessary
condition for the state of antagonism in an analytical form. We begin by noting that
when the fraction of outsiders equals the average tolerance, i.e., when fg = 〈Tr〉,
approximately one-half the insiders become radicals [32,33]. This makes the fraction of
radicals in the total population fr = 0.5(1− fg) and the fraction of tacit supporters
among the remaining insiders ft = 0.5(1− fg)fg. Thus fr + ft = 0.5(1− f2g ) < 50% for
any 0 < fg ≤ 1, indicating that radicals and their tacit supporters achieve the majority
needed to engage in herd behavior when fg > 〈Tr〉. The condition for herd behavior,
fr + ft ≥ 50%, is thus supplemented by fg = (1 + )〈Tr〉 to yield fr = (0.5 + )× (1− fg),
ft = (0.5− )× (1− fg)fg, and  ≥ 0.5f2g /(1− fg)2. We find that herd behavior occurs
only when the dynamics permit 〈Tr〉 ≤ fg(1− fg)2/(1− 2fg + 1.5f2g ) while still
fg < 50%. When large p1 values stop the fraction of outsiders from reaching values
higher than fg ≈ 0.2, the condition for herd behavior simplifies to 〈Tr〉 ≤ fg.
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Although the tolerance of the original insider population is preserved in this
case—i.e., outsiders who assimilate insider cultural patterns become a part of the same
distribution of tolerance—this is not always the outcome. Assimilated outsiders may
either be more tolerant towards “their own” than the average insider, or they may want
to radically separate from their own past. Lacking reliable data, we study a scenario in
which the tolerance of an assimilated outsider is determined using a uniform
distribution between zero and unity (see the blue curves in Fig. 3). Thus tolerance turns
into a dynamic variable that, depending on the initial average tolerance, may increase or
decrease the tolerance of the society. Using the simplified condition for herd behavior,
〈Tr〉 ≤ fg, we focus on the “race” between the tolerance level and the fraction of
outsiders to determine whether a society splits into two non-interacting subpopulations
or ends up being dominated by one of them. We can understand this qualitatively by
assuming that both 〈Tr〉 and fg grow over time linearly. Thus 〈Tr〉(t) = 〈Tr〉(0) + vT t
and fg(t) = fg(0) + vgt, where 〈Tr〉(0) and fg(0) denote the initial values of 〈Tr〉 and fg,
respectively, and vT and vg are the corresponding growth rates. Herd behavior and a
subsequent breakdown ensue when
fg(t) ≥ 〈Tr〉(0)− fg(0)
1− vTvg
+ fg(0). (3)
In other words, a small initial average tolerance value and a rapid outsider growth rate
increases the probability that there will be a breakdown.
Another scenario deserving attention is that the assimilation process may require a
minimum amount of time. Accordingly, only outsiders that entered the system at a
given moment in the past could be assimilated into insiders. We analyzed the delay in
the assimilation process by means of numerical simulations and described the results in
SI text.
Data
Figure 4. Proxies for assim-
ilation and tolerance in the
real world: the case of the
EU countries. The net assimila-
tion rate is quantified by MIPEX
index, whereas the average toler-
ance is quantified by the fraction
of pro-immigration votes. A con-
siderable scatter emphasizes that
countries differ in preparedness to
accept immigrants (parameter p1)
and their levels of tolerance (pa-
rameters Tminr and σ). Left of the
red dashed line are the countries
that are openly anti-immigrant.
We are using the terms
“insider” and “outsider” metaphorically,
but the model can be applied to any
situation with a built-in asymmetry,
e.g., if a majority provides support
to a minority. When the European
Parliament recently discussed
the migration of refugees into Europe,
they concluded that this current
global trend is not just short-term
or temporary. When the question
of whether to increase the number
of immigrants from the Middle East
and sub-Saharan Africa was presented,
some EU countries voted against any
additional immigration [34]. If we assume that these votes are proxies for the level of a
country’s tolerance towards minorities and use our model to interpret the outcome of
the voting, we find that (i) different countries have different levels of tolerance
(parameters Tminr and σ in the model) and (ii) some countries have already reached a
critical point in which anti-immigrant radicals and tacit supporters are in the majority.
We extend this analogy and use the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) [35]
as a proxy for the assimilation rate (parameter p1) and plot the data in Fig. 4 using the
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same procedure as in Fig. 3. In this manner, x-axes (y-axes) of both figures point in the
direction of increasing tolerance (assimilation), controlled by parameter σ (p1) in Fig. 3
and represented by the fraction of pro-immigrant votes (MIPEX) in Fig. 4. We find
that openly anti-immigrant countries end up in the left lower corner, as expected from
the results of the model, but that we can obtain the EU country borderlines that
delineate the different dynamical regimes only when information on the distribution of
tolerance—presently approximated by a uniform distribution in the model—is available.
The lack of any clear correlation in Fig. 4 is indicative of the complexity of the real
world in that at least one additional, and possibly more, explanatory factor(s) affect the
relationship between assimilation and tolerance. However, despite being a very rough
approximation of reality, the scatter pattern in Fig. 4 is rather informative when
interpreted in conjunction with the model results.
Three groups of countries are identifiable in Fig. 4. The countries historically
exposed to large immigration inflows (e.g., the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain etc.) are
both more tolerant and better equipped to receive immigrants. These countries appear
in the upper-right corner of the plot, corresponding to the Mutualism domain in Fig. 3.
By contrast, the countries in the lower-left corner (the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Latvia), corresponding to the Antagonism domain in Fig. 3, are former
socialist states, ethnically and culturally homogeneous, and lacking substantial
immigration. These countries therefore felt little pressure to enact effective immigration
policies, which is reflected in their low proxy for assimilation. Furthermore, a low proxy
for tolerance is less surprising if a country is unaccustomed to a large direct inflow of
immigrants (e.g., Hungary) or, for that matter, to large inflows into neighboring
countries (e.g., the Czech Republic and Poland in relation to Germany).
Figure 5. Success of the
right-wing nationalist parties
during the recent elections
across Europe. Listed are
the European countries that con-
tained more than 7% of right-wing
nationalist voters in nationwide
elections held in 2014 or 2015.
The fraction of right-wing nation-
alist voters in many countries ex-
ceeded the percentage of the pop-
ulation that “was troubled by the
presence of people of other nation-
ality, race, or religion” in Europe
in the early 1990s [36] (range in-
dicated by the red dashed lines).
Only parties that openly oppose
immigration were included. ∗For
countries where national elections
were held before 2014, we used
the results of the last European
parliament elections. ∗∗In Esto-
nia, the results of the two major
right-wing nationalist parties were
summed.
The third group
of countries is found in the lower-right
corner of Fig. 4, corresponding
to the Outsider dominance domain
in Fig. 3. Among the members of this
group are countries that maintained
ethnic and cultural homogeneity,
and/or lacked substantial immigration,
which is consistent with a low
proxy for assimilation. As for the high
tolerance, most of these countries (not
Greece though) were largely unaffected
by the immigration wave prior to
the EU vote because of, among other
reasons, geographic locations off the
main migration pathways (e.g., Estonia,
Lithuania, and Ireland, but also
Romania, and at the time Croatia and
Slovenia). Since the vote, however, some countries were struck by the crisis more
seriously and at least one (Slovenia) reversed its previous policy. The overall conclusion
is that the scatter pattern in Fig. 4 is reminiscent of the domains in Fig. 3.
When an incursion of outsiders decreases the level of benevolence in a benevolent
society this decrease appears to be related to the radicalization process (see Fig. 5). For
example, in the 1980s there was a dramatic increase in the number of refugees and
illegal immigrants entering European countries and by the early 1990s this had
provoked a wave of radical right-wing populism [36]. Between 11 and 14% of the
population of Europe found other nationalities, races, or religions unsettling, and this
group became a major source of votes for right-wing nationalist parties [36]. The recent
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migration trend brought a new wave of success for right-wing nationalists, suggesting
that the population of many European countries has been radicalized beyond that
recorded in the early 1990s (see Fig. 5). The fraction of right-wing voters in a given
country may not correlate with the fraction of immigrants because (i) the EU is a
supra-national entity without internal borders between the member states, and (ii) EU
countries are not equally tolerant, i.e., each country exhibits its own value of parameter
σ. Note that supporters of right-wing nationalist parties seem to originate from two
social groups [36], (i) those in competition with non-European immigrants for jobs and
housing (identified as radicals in our model), and (ii) the “new middle class” consisting
of highly educated, often self-employed, yet politically restless youth who are less likely
to admit belonging to the political right (the tacit supporters in our model).
Discussion
We have devised and analyzed a social dynamics model in which the benevolence level
of an insider population decreases in response to an incursion of outsiders. Because this
decrease is a result of radicalization, it often generates an increase in violent
incidents [28, 37–39]. This increase can function as early-warning signal that the society
is approaching a critical point in which all relations between insiders and outsiders
abruptly terminate. The heterogeneity in the tolerance among European countries can
mean that the EU tolerance is as strong as its weakest link, and that if the cooperation
in the least tolerant EU country abruptly terminates this breakdown can trigger a
cascade of societal breakdowns through other EU countries. This cascade phenomenon
is a general characteristic of complex systems, and thus cooperation as a counterforce is
essential if societies are to continue functioning [30,31]. The EU is currently facing an
increase in religious intolerance and a huge inflow of immigrants, and some societies are
responding by raising walls or fences on their borders, a strong signal that these
societies have already reached a critical point. It is thus extremely important that we
understand how a society reacts to the increasing inflow of outsiders and identify the
links that produce an increase in violent incidents. Understanding the underlying social
dynamics may help policy makers undertake legislative actions that will prevent
potential conflicts on a much larger scale. Nations need to strike a balance between the
short-term benefit of accepting immigrants and any potential long-term violence.
One limitation of our approach is that we give the population topology a secondary
role. We assume (i) that each member of each subpopulation (insiders and outsiders) is
equally able to assimilate the cultural patterns of the other subpopulation and (ii) that
new agents who enter the system as a part of population growth make friends randomly,
irrespective of identity tags. Because of homophily [40], we envision adding a
preferential attachment (PA) factor [41] which makes new outsiders more likely to
connect to older outsiders and new insiders more likely to connect to older insiders.
Using PA changes the topology of the population, and hubs of predominantly single
subpopulation agents appear. In this structure will the assimilation rate be the same
for, e.g., an outsider surrounded by outsiders and an outsider in a mixed neighborhood?
A more realistic treatment of the assimilation issue under PA may be the formalism of
Watts [25] or extension of Watts [42], i.e., an agent may be more likely to change their
tag if they are befriended by an increasing number of agents carrying the opposite tag.
These considerations again have important implications for a country’s immigration
policy. In France, for example, large immigrant communities exist in Greater Paris,
Lyon, and Marseille, suggesting that immigration indeed tends to be a PA-type process.
The same is true in much of Western Europe, suggesting that the assimilation rate is
severely impeded by the topology of a mixed native and immigrant population. The
result is two ethnically-split subpopulations, which, in light of the work of Esteban,
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Mayoral, and Ray [43], is a dangerous combination, i.e., two measures of ethnic
division— fractionalization and polarization—jointly influence an increase in violent
incidents and the possibility of intrastate wars. A potential measure against that
outcome may be exemplified by Singapore, where tenants in government-built housing
(which is 88% of all housing) must be of mixed ethnic origin.
Modulating the asymmetry of interactions to attain a preferred evolutionary result is
found not only in human, but in animal “societies” as well. For instance, a benefit
differential similar to our ∆b arises in mutualistic relationships in nature if some
symbionts provide less benefit to a host than others, and the host cannot discriminate
between them [44]. The local stability of the cooperative state may be maintained by a
non-equilibrium mechanism of density-dependent interference competition among
symbionts [45]. However, the local stability means that mutualism between the host and
symbionts may turn into antagonism for a period of time due to the outside
(environmental) conditions. To stabilize mutualism, hosts generally punish less
cooperative symbionts [44,46], thus pushing the system to a cooperative steady-state.
Reminiscent of Popper’s statement, the host cannot maintain unlimited tolerance
towards less cooperative symbionts indefinitely.
Mathematical modeling helps us understand the relationships between the main
forces shaping a phenomenon of interest. The society, however, is extremely complex in
the sense that human interactions are inhomogeneous, processes occur at multiple time
scales, and state variables—e.g., size, production, and wealth—are unconserved
quantities. It is therefore inappropriate to treat the results of mathematical modeling as
a substitute for an informed discussion between policymakers. At best, modeling results
aid such discussions by making them more informed.
Supporting Information
Equilibrium and stability. An issue of some importance is the stability of the
outcomes—mutualism, outsider dominance, and antagonism—of the social dynamics.
Antagonism is a non-equilibrium absorbing state such that whether the system ends up
in this state or not depends on the path from the initial condition to the equilibrium
attractor(s). An analytical inequality that delineates the border between the state of
antagonism and the other two states in the parameter space is presented in the main
text. However, very little has been said about the model’s equilibrium and stability as
the key determinants for the states of mutualism and outsider dominance.
We begin by finding the necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium. The
fraction of outsiders in the system, fg, according to the model description obeys the
following equation
fg(t+ 1) = [R(t)− p1(t)] fg(t), (4)
where R is the ratio of the fitness of outsiders to the average fitness of the whole
population and p1 is the assimilation rate. If the system is in an equilibrium, we have
fg(t+ 1) = fg(t) and therefore p1 = R− 1. Conversely, if the last equality is satisfied,
we immediately obtain fg(t+ 1) = fg(t). A necessary and sufficient condition for the
equilibrium is thus p1 = R− 1. This straightforward condition, unfortunately, cannot
guarantee that the system has only one (globally stable) equilibrium because R depends
on fg in a relatively complex manner despite the simplifying assumptions used in model
construction.
Next, we set to find an analytical expression for the dependence of R on fg in hope
to learn more about the model’s equilibrium and the overall dynamics. To that end, it
is first necessary to examine the interactions between agents in more detail. We said
that at each time step, m pairs of agents were randomly selected to cooperate with each
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Table S1. Definitions of the interactions between the different pairs of agents.
Pair Probability Fitness Fitness
(recipient, donor) pi Φ1 Φ2
(I,O) p1 +b −c
(I, I) p2 +(b− c) 0
(O,O) p3 0 +(b− c)
(O, I) p4 −(c+ ∆c) +(b+ ∆b)
b and c, b > c benefit and cost of cooperation, respectively.
∆b and ∆c benefit and cost differentials, respectively.
other, where the result of this cooperation depended on who played the role of a donor
and a recipient. When selecting a random pair of agents, there are four possible
outcomes, which we denote (I,O), (I, I), (O,O), and (O, I), with O (I) indicating an
outsider (insider). Let us also denote with pi, i ∈ {1, ..., 4} the corresponding
probabilities.
To find these probabilities, we note that in the case of, say, p1, an insider is
randomly selected with the probability determined by the abundance of insiders, i.e.,
1− fg. However, we also need to know the probability of randomly picking an outsider
from the insider’s neighborhood. Among the connections an insider has at any moment
in time, there are 〈k〉fgX(fg) outsiders and 〈k〉(1− fg) insiders, where 〈k〉 is the
average degree at the beginning and X(fg) is the probability that the insider has not
severed its links with outsiders. Because we assume a uniform distribution of tolerance,
U(Tminr , Tminr + σ), it turns out that X(fg) = 1−min{max{0, U(fg)}, 1}, where
U(fg) = (fg − Tminr )/(σ − Tminr ). By taking the ratio between the number of the
insider’s connections to outsiders and the total number of connections that this insider
has, we get the desired probability (of randomly picking an outsider in the insider’s
neighborhood), fgX(fg)/(fgX(fg) + (1− fg)). It follows that
p1 = (1− fg)× fgX(fg)
fgX(fg) + (1− fg) . (5)
Analogous reasoning leads to the following expressions
p2 = (1− fg)× 1− fg
fgX(fg) + (1− fg) , (6)
p3 = fg × fg
fgX(fg) + (1− fg) , and (7)
p4 = fg × (1− fg)X(fg)
fgX(fg) + (1− fg) . (8)
Using probabilities pi, i ∈ {1, ..., 4}, it is possible to analytically express the fitness
of insider, Φ1, and outsider, Φ2, subpopulations. Fitness is defined as the average
per-capita benefit net of the cost of cooperation. A convenient way to calculate fitness
is (i) to separately find the average net benefit resulting from the interactions that
involve insiders on the one hand and outsiders on the other hand, and (ii) to divide
these quantities with the average number of insiders and outsiders, respectively, per
interaction. For example, if (I,O) pair interacts, then we have one insider and one
outsider taking part in a single interaction, but if the pair is (I, I), then a single
interaction involves two insiders, which has to be taken into account. How fitness is
affected when any of the four possible pairs of agents interact is presented in Table S1.
Before writing down the expressions for fitness, we note that the setup in Table S1 is
dependent only on the magnitude of costs relative to benefits. Accordingly, in all
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numerical simulations, c/b = ∆c/∆b = 10%, with ∆b/b = 25%. First we address the
fitness of the insider subpopulation, calculated here as the aforementioned division of (i)
the average net benefit from the interactions involving insiders and (ii) the average
number of insiders per interaction. The equation is
Φ1 =
0.5(p1 + p4)b+ p2(b− c)− 0.5(p1 + p4)(c+ ∆c)
p1 + 2p2 + p4
. (9)
The numerator in this equation is practically read off from Table S1, with one
twist—after randomly drawing pairs (I,O) or (O, I), who acts as a donor and who acts
as a recipient is still undecided, yet each role is equally likely, thus causing the term
0.5(p1 + p4) to appear. The denominator expresses the idea that pairs (I,O) and (O, I)
appear with probabilities p1 and p4, respectively, and contain a single insider, whereas
pair (I, I) appears with probability p2, but contains two insiders. An analogous
equation for the fitness of outsiders is
Φ2 =
−0.5(p1 + p4)c+ p3(b− c) + 0.5(p1 + p4)(b+ ∆b)
p1 + 2p3 + p4
. (10)
One last step in the present analysis is to combine Eqs. [9] and [10] into the fitness
ratio, R = Φ2/ [Φ1(1− fg) + Φ2fg]. Function R defined in this way faithfully
reproduces the curves in Fig. 1 obtained by means of numerical simulations. More
importantly, in a typical model setup whereby outsiders are attracted into the system,
function R monotonically decreases until an equilibrium point is reached (unless the
model trajectory gets trapped beforehand in the absorbing state, i.e., the state of
antagonism). Because R is monotonically decreasing, there can be only one point that
satisfies condition p1 = R− 1, thus indicating that the model equilibrium is globally
stable.
Figure S1. Delayed assimi-
lation excites damped oscil-
lations without shifting the
model’s equilibrium point.
An increasing delay in the assim-
ilation process leaves the equi-
librium point of the model un-
changed, yet modifies the dynam-
ics in two important ways: (i)
as the fraction of outsiders starts
to increase, delayed assimilation
affects less individuals than in-
stantaneous assimilation, thus al-
lowing a sharper rise of outsiders
in the system and (ii) because
the assimilation process trails the
current state of the system, the
fraction of outsiders overshoots
the equilibrium point and sets off
damped oscillations. The longer
the delay, the higher the ampli-
tude of oscillations. The average
tolerance is 〈Tr〉 = 0.40. The as-
similation rate is p1 = 0.1.
Delayed
assimilation. In the main text, we
assumed that the assimilation process
is effective instantaneously, whereas
in reality it may take some time
for outsiders to assimilate new cultural
patterns. This possibility is readily
taken into account by introducing
delay τ , such that the fraction
of outsiders present in the system
at time t− τ is assimilated at rate
p1. Here, we examine how introducing
delayed assimilation affects the model
dynamics and discuss several important
implications of the obtained results.
Delay in the assimilation process
brings about two noticeable changes
in the model dynamics (Fig. S1). First,
if the fraction of outsiders is increasing,
fewer individuals are influenced by delayed assimilation in comparison to the
instantaneous assimilation. A consequence is that the fraction of outsiders increases at a
higher rate when there is some delay than when there is none. Second, delayed
assimilation leaves the model equilibrium unaffected, but—by trailing the current state
of the system—makes it possible that the fraction of outsiders temporarily overshoots
the equilibrium point and sets off damped oscillations. These new features in the model
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dynamics change the critical average tolerance that marks the border between a
mutualistic and an antagonistic relationship.
To reach mutualism under delayed assimilation, a society must be more tolerant than
under instantaneous assimilation (Fig. S2). Namely, the temporary accumulation of
outsiders above the equilibrium point, which is impossible without a delay, may just be
enough to push an otherwise mutualistic system into antagonism. Because antagonism
is a non-equilibrium absorbing state, it is irrelevant that the delay has no effect on the
model’s equilibrium. What matters is the path that leads to the equilibrium point, and
that path turns less favorable for mutualism with the introduction of delayed
assimilation. The higher the delay, the less likely the mutualistic relationship.
Accordingly, the critical average tolerance increases with the delay (τ) from a lower
limit at τ = 0 to a theoretical upper limit (see the main text) beyond which the state of
antagonism disappears altogether. This lower limit decreases with the assimilation rate
(p1), yet the theoretical upper limit is independent of p1. Consequences are that (i) the
described effect of delayed assimilation is stronger at high values of p1 and (ii) the
critical average tolerance becomes independent of p1 at high enough τ .
How are the overall outcomes of the social dynamics changed by delayed
assimilation? To answer this question, in Fig. S3, we provide a map of the parameter
space under instantaneous assimilation (τ = 0) overlaid with the same kind of map
under delayed assimilation (τ = 5). As expected from point (i) above, there is very little
change in the results if the assimilation rate is relatively low. The results, by contrast,
change markedly at high assimilation rates, with mutualism giving way to antagonism.
We notice that in line with point (ii) above, the border delineating the states of
mutualism and antagonism exhibits less dependence on the assimilation rate (p1) than
in the case of instantaneous assimilation. Having longer delays than τ = 5 (see Fig. S2)
would erase this dependence altogether because the border between mutualism and
antagonism would be pushed toward its theoretical limit, which is independent of p1.
Figure S2. Society must
be more tolerant for delayed
assimilation to be effective.
Critical tolerance level marking
the border between mutualism
and antagonism increases with the
delay in the assimilation process.
This increase is a consequence of
the temporary accumulation of
outsiders above the equilibrium
point, which is impossible with-
out a delay. Note that the criti-
cal average tolerance has a lower
limit dependent on the assimila-
tion rate (p1) and a theoretical
upper limit (see the main text)
denoted by a dashed line that is
independent of p1. Consequently,
(i) the effect shown in this figure
strengthens with p1 and (ii) the
critical average tolerance becomes
independent of p1 at high enough
τ .
The outcomes of the social
dynamics under delayed assimilation
have an important implication
in the context of immigration policies.
It turns out that having in place
very efficient assimilation programs
(corresponding to a high value
of p1) may not mean they are effective.
To achieve the effectiveness, it is also
necessary that such programs produce
the expected results rather quickly
(corresponding to a low value of τ). An
alternative path to avoiding excessive
radicalization is to introduce measures
that improve the average tolerance
of insiders. Provided p1 is high enough,
a higher average tolerance favors
the prospect of reaching a mutualistic
equilibrium even if there is a considerable delay. An inevitable conclusion is that a
successful immigration policy is a tough balancing act that requires people to make
concessions in order to learn how to live together.
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Figure S3. Outcomes of the social dynamics with delayed assimilation. In
much of the parameter space, delayed assimilation has a minor effect on the mutualism
of insiders and outsiders, except when the rate at which outsiders are assimilated is
relatively high. At high assimilation rates, mutualism gives way to antagonism because
the delay causes the system to temporarily accumulate more outsiders than it would
be possible otherwise, which in turn triggers herd behavior even among more tolerant
insiders.
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